Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. eBook: Moran, Richard: Amazon.com.au: Kindle Store.
CHAPTER ONE. The Image of Self- Knowledge; CHAPTER TWO. Making Up Your Mind: Self-Interpretationand Self-Constitution; CHAPTER THREE Self-Knowledge as Discovery and as Resolution; CHAPTER FOUR. The Authority of Self-Consciousness; CHAPTER FIVE Impersonality, Expression, and the Undoing of Self-Knowledge; Bibliography; Index.
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge Richard Moran. Chapter 1. THE IMAGE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE. The question of the nature of first-person relations has not suffered from philosophical neglect in recent years. Perhaps unsurprisingly, attention has tended to concentrate on the particular relation of knowledge; and even more particularly, on the specifically first-person awareness.
Citation Moran, Richard. 2004. Precis of Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69, no. 2: 423-426.
Advanced Ethics An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy.
Critical notice of Richard Moran, authority and estrangement: An essay on self-knowledge.
Richard Moran. 2001. Authority and Estrangement: An essay on self-knowledge. Princeton University Press.
Critical Notice of Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.
Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of ''first-person authority''--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive.
In this paper I deal with Richard Moran's account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of.
In this article, I respond to the comments of six philosophers on my book Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. My reply to Joseph Corbi mostly concerns the relation between the two modes of self-knowledge I call 'avowal' and 'attribution,' and the sense of activity involved in self-knowledge; in responding to Joseph Prades I try to clarify my picture of deliberation and show.